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LANDS UNDER WATER IN NEW YORK
WILLIAM SHANKLAND ANDREWS*

The question to be considered is the title of the beds of non-tidal
streams, rivers, ponds andlakes. Isitinthestate, or is it in the riparian
proprietors? Questions as to the Mohawk and the Hudson, to which
special rules apply' and as to boundary lakes and rivers are omitted.
The answer may have practical importance in questions of property
rights. At least in streams not navigable in fact, the sole right to
fisheries is in the owner of the soil beneath.2 Probably so as to navigable streams as well.3 Likewise, such owner has the right to shoot4
and the right to take ice,5 and to him belong sand, gravel and ore beneath the surface 6 and newly formed islands.7 Again, in certain cases
of reliction a determination of the title is important." Then also
there is the right to erect dams and other structures on one's land. 9
And while all these rights in waters navigable in fact are subject to
an easement in favor of the public for navigation and commerce;
while for such purposes the stream or lake may be improved without
compensation to the owner of the bed, still they are property rights
protected by the Constitution."0 Over some waters this easement of
navigation rests in the United States by virtue of the commerce
clause of the Constitution. These waters have been defined as all
waters which are navigable and accessible from a state other than that
in which they lie. Over others, in fact navigable, New York has the
*Former Associate Judge of the New York Court of Appeals.
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like jurisdiction. For the purposes of this article no distinction need
be made, for in either case the public rights are limited to this one
object. As the owner of the fee of a highway may object to its use
for other than highway purposes, so may the owner of the bed of a
stream object to its use for purposes other than navigation."
When Europeans first came to America they found the land within
the present limits of New York in the actual occupation of various
Indian tribes. Here whether title came to the Crown by virtue of
original discovery or by conquest from the Dutch, it did come to it,
after the treaties of Breda and Westminster under one theory or the
other. More or less completely the common law became the law of
the land. Under it, the Indians were held to have no ownership of
the territories occupied by them. Sovereignty over them and the
ultimate ownership of the lands they were on was vested in the Crown.
Such lands were held not as part of the King's private domain but for
the benefit of the nation. Still the ill-defined right of occupation was
respected. Only when lost to the Indians by conquest or by contract
might the King or his grantees enter into full and unobstructed possession.
Whatever rights passed to the Duke of York under the patents of
1664 and x674 are unimportant now. Whatever they may have been,
they became merged when James was crowned in 1685, and on the
American revolution all title, rights, dominion, sovereignty possessed
theretofore by the Crown, or by the King and Parliament passed to
the state.
The boundary between the several states and Canada was fixed
by the Treaty of Paris. It reached the St. Lawrence River at the
mouth of the St. Regis. Thence it ran towards the west through the
center of that river and the Niagara and through the center of Lakes
Ontario and Erie. But as to the lines between the states themselves
there was still question. Charters or grants of territory extended
from the Atlantic to the unknown "south sea" or "southern ocean!'
gave room for conflict. Such was the quarrel between New York and
Massachusetts. The latter claimed sovereignty, jurisdiction, title to
much of the present New York.
New York protested vigorously. Probably it was right. For
years it had exercised sovereignty over the territory. Control over
the Iroquois, so far as there was control, rested in its government.
The arms of the Duke had been placed in their villages. Treaties
had been made with them and intercourse with them regulated. Still
"Smith v. Rochester, supra note I; Andrews, New York and its Waters, (193o) 16
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the claim of Massachusetts existed and it was not merely frivolous.
So when application was made to the congress of the Confederation
to arbitrate the matter, the two states decided to settle the quarrel
without outside interference. The result was the Treaty of Hartford
(1786) -essentially a compromise.
By it Massachusetts ceded to New York "all the claim, right and
Title" which it "hath to the Government, Sovereignty and Jurisdiction" of lands within New York's present boundaries and all claims
to lands east of the so-called preemption line. In return New York
ceded to Massachusetts and its grantees "the right of preemption of
the Soil from the native Indians and all other the Estate, Right,
Title and Property" of a tract of about six million acres, beginning
at a point in the Pennsylvania line at the present south east corner
of Steuben County and running thence due north to Lake Ontario
at Sodus Bay. This line ran through Seneca Lake.12 From Sodus
Bay the line was continued to the Canadian boundary. Thence it
followed that boundary (with the exception of a mile strip along the
Niagara River) to the state's western boundary. Thence south and
east to the place of beginning. The territory so ceded contained
a number of large and small lakes, and some streams and rivers, the
largest of which was the Genesee River. It was unsettled country.
Briefly to complete the story, Massachusetts agreed to sell the
whole tract, with the preemption rights, to a Mr. Phelps and a Mr.
Gorham. These gentlemen extinguishedthe Indian rights to about two
million acres lying west of the preemption line. This was conveyed
to them by Massachusetts. As to the balance of the contract they
failed. Title to the remaining four million acres was therefore in
large part conveyed by the state to Robert Morris and ultimately
vested in the Holland Land Company.
All title therefore to lands west of the preemption line are to be
traced back to Massachusetts and thence back to New York. No
one claims that we may ignore the Treaty of Hartford and referring
to the royal charters decide anew whether title to this territory was
originally in Massachusetts. Situated as these lands are in New York
subject to the jurisdiction of our courts, controlled by the political
action of our government, we must hold that title comes to the present owners through the grant from New York to Massachusetts.
Massachusetts itself makes no other claim. The act passed November
21st, 1788, deeding the two million acres to Phelps and Gorham
refers to the lands "ceded by the State of New York." In a recent
"City of Geneva v. Henson, i95 N.

Y. 447, 88

N. E. i1o4 (19o9).
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casela the Supreme Court makes no such suggestion. And that
Court speaks of title to these lands as acquired by Massachusetts
through the treaty.
East of the preemption line, all titles are to be traced back either
to gralits by the Dutch, the Crown, or the state. Dutch grants, so
far as we are concerned, were along the Hudson or Mohawk rivers,
and their effect, as has been said, will not be considered here. We
have to do only with Crown or state grants to individuals and the
cession of property rights to the State of Massachusetts.
Under the English common law, waters where the tide ebbed and
flowed were called "navigable". Considered as arms of the sea, it
was held that presumptively title to the soil beneath was held by
the Crown for the public good. Any alleged private ownership must
be strictly proved. As to non-tidal waters the presumption was to
the contrary. The beds were presumed to belong to the riparian
proprietors, although here again it might be shown that title to the
shores and to the land under water had been separated. This presumption has governed even as to such lakes as Lough Neagh
(eighteen miles by eleven)13 or Lough Erne (slightly smaller).14
We adopted the common law so far as it was applicable to our own
conditions. 15 It has been argued that the English theory because of
our greater rivers and larger lakes is not practical here. It has even
been said that writers have been mistaken as to what in truth the
English theory was. 6 Such seems to be the view of the Supreme
Court of the United States.' 7 Whatever is held elsewhere, however,
there can be little doubt that the rule in New York as to non-tidal
rivers is settled.' With us the word "navigable" has a purely technical meaning. Rightly or wrongly that meaning has been adopted
and is now too firmly fixed to be questioned. And the ownership of
the beds of waters lying wholly within the state, is to be determined
by the laws of. that state. 19
The New York rule as to the beds of small unnavigable streams and
ponds may be briefly stated. As to it there is no dispute. Except in
'm Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U. S. 65,46 Sup. Ct. 357 (1925).
3

" Bristow v. Cormican, 3 App. Cas. 641, 666 (1878); Johnston v. O'Neill, [19111
A. C. 552, 577.

"Johnston v. Bloomfield, 8 Ir. R. C. L. 68 (1868).
' 5Fulton L., H. &. P. Co. v. State, 20o N. Y. 400, 412, 94 N. E. 199, 202 (I911).
16
People v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N. Y. 461 (1865).
"Illinois Central R. R. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 13 Sup. Ct. 11O (I82);
,Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. I, 14 Sup. Ct. 538 (1893); United States v. Holt
Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 46 Sup. Ct. 197 (1925).
IsFulton L., H. & P. Co. v. New York, supra note 15 (The Oswego).
'Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, ix Sup. Ct. 808 (I890).
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unusual cases where title has been reserved, it rests in the riparian
20
proprietors. Instances where the rule applies are Copake lake,
Cromwell lake, 2' Fish lake,2 2 Lime lake,m Silver lake,2 Croton lake,"

and Spring lake.26 All these are comparatively small bodies of water.
And the same rule would apply both east and west of the cession
line. For the cession to Massachusetts was equivalent to a grant to
an individual. What a patentee might claim under it, Massachusetts
may claim. It held these lands not as a sovereign but as a private
27
proprietoy.
The same thing may be said of larger streams even where they are
navigable in fact. A grant of land bordering upon them carries title to
the center unless their bed is excluded by the terms of the instru28
ment.
Wholly within the State, however, are a number of lakes of considerable size. Many are east of the cession line; many west. Again,
I think the same rule, whatever it may be applies to both. The only
doubt might arise because of a few sentences in Massachusetts v. New
York.2 9 That case had to do with the claim of Massachusetts to title
to the bed of Lake Ontario under the language of the Hartford treaty.
"It is a principle" the court says "that the title to the soil under navigable waters is in the sovereign, except so far as private rights in it
have been acquired by express grant or prescription... The dominion over navigable waters and property in the soil urider them, are so
identified with the exercise of the sovereign powers of government
that a presumption against their separation from sovereignty must be
indulged, in construing all grants by the sovereign, of lands to be held
20

Land & Lake Ass'n v. Conklin, 182 App. Div. 546, 17o N. Y. Supp. 427 (4th
Dept. 2928).
"Commonwealth Water Co. v. Brunner, 175 App. Div. 153, 16I N. Y. Supp.
794 (2d Dept. 1916).
"Wilcox v. Bread, 92 Hun 9 (N. Y. 1895), afrd, 157 N. Y. 713, 53 N. E. 1133

(i899).
"Hazelton v. Webster, 2o App. Div. I77, 46 N. Y. Supp. 922 (4th Dept. 1897),
aff'd, i6I N. Y. 628, 55 N. E. io96 (igoo).
24Deuterman v. Gainsbory, 54 App. Div. 575, 66 N. Y. Supp. ioo9 (2d Dept.

i909), aff'd,
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N. Y. 595, 64 N. E.1120

(1902).

"Gouverneur
v. Nat. Ice Co., I34 N. Y. 355, 31 N. E. 865 (1892).
2
1Calkins v. Hart,

219

N. Y. 145, 113 N. E. 785 (I916).

27Massachusetts v.New York, supra note

12a;

Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. Y. 57

(1875).
28

Ex pa le Jennings, 6 Cow. 518 (N. Y. 1826) (Chittenango Creek); Commissioners of Canal Fund v. Kumpsall, 26 Wend. 404 (N.Y. 1841) (The Genesee);
Chenango Bridge Co. v. Paige, 83 N. Y. 178 (188o) (The Chenango); Fulton L.,
H. & P. Co. v. New York, supranote 15 (The Oswego)..
29Supra note I2a.
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in private ownership." 30 It follows that a grant of government and
sovereignty from one state to another carries, as an incident, title to
land under navigable waters.
"[T]he Treaty of Hartford... gave to New York, as incident to
its sovereignty, title to all lands under navigable waters."'"
These statements are properly applicable to boundary lakes of
great size like Ontario and Erie where conflicts of jurisdiction might
be the result of divided ownership and where the interests of a foreign
nation are involved. And in this case there were various circumstances which corroborated the construction given to the treaty.
The Supreme Court, however, certainly did not intend to pass upon
the title to the bed of the Genesee River or the land under Hemlock
Lake, both waters navigable in fact, which belong to the riparian
proprietors. As pointed out above, the grant to Massachusetts must
be construed in the light of the settled law of New York. It is so con2
ceded in Massachusettsv. New York.1
We must consider, therefore, these larger lakes. Lake George is
thirty-three miles long by a mile and a quarter in breadth. There are
Oneida, Skaneateles, Cayuga, Seneca comparable in size. There are
Otsego, Onondaga, Chautauqua, Keuka, others, smaller, but all of
which are navigable in fact. On all, boats have plied carrying passengers and freight. There is a lake like Cazenovia, five miles by
three-quarters, used probably only by pleasure boats.
I can point to no case where the Court of Appeals has decided what
rule is to be applied to these situations. Nor earlier is there anything
decisive. We are told that the law as to lakes is derived from the law
as to rivers." Yet there is slight resemblance between a lake of the
size and shape of Oneida and the Oneida river.
The construction of grants is based largely on the assumed intent
of the parties. And the assumption that the state by the grant of one
hundred square feet bordering on Oneida Lake intended as attached
to it to grant a strip of land under water two miles in length, is a violent one. In such cases the rule is impractical. We feel so instinctively. Our common sense revolts in the case of such a body of water.
The argument ab inconvenienti may often be insufficient to justify an
exception to settled rules.4 "This is true where the law is clear.
Where it is unsettled the result of a proposed rule may turn the
30

Ibid. 89, 46 Sup. Ct. at 361.

31!Wd. 9o , 46 Sup. Ct. at 361.

32 Ibid. 93, 46 Sup. Ct. at 362.
nCalkins v. Hart, suPra note 26.
34Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 397, i Sup. Ct. 8o8, 817 (189o).

LANDS UNDER WATER IN NEW YORK
scale." 31 And when it comes to Lake Michigan, the Supreme Court
itself gives weight to this consideration."
As has been said, we have no controlling decision, but our courts
have touched upon the question. What was said in Commissions v.
People7 that the common law rule does not embrace our large fresh
water lakes or inland seas was purely dictum. In City of Geneva v.
Henson38 the court felt bound by certain findings of fact with regard
to Seneca Lake. In Sweet v. City of Syracuse"9 while the court noticed
the contention that the bed of Skaneateles Lake was in the state, it
did not pass upon the finding of the General Term to that effect. In
Smith v. Rochester 0 there is a dictum of the Chief Judge "in passing"
that the doctrine that the bed of fresh water streams where the tide
does not ebb and flow belongs in common right to the owners of the
soil adjacent is inapplicable to the "vast" fresh water lakes and
streams of this country. Finally in Stewart v. Turney4' the court
said "Were it necessary we would hold, however, that with regard to
a grant of land on Cayuga Lake an exception should be made to the
common-law rule. ''4 Again a dictum, but apparently made with
deliberation.
With regard to these largest lakes, therefore, I believe we may
fairly conclude that should the matter ever arise the Court of Appeals would hold that the fee of their beds was in the state and that
title of the riparian proprietor extended but to low water mark.4
Then come lakes smaller in size, but still useful for commerceOtsego, Onondaga, Canandaigua, Keuka and others. Is the exception
to be applied here also? As to this there may be more difficulty.
Hemlock Lake is seven miles long and one-half mile wide, forming
part of the navigable waters of the state. Rochester diverted its
waters for municipal purposes to the injury of proprietors along its
outlet. This was a wrongful act. Ownership of the bed of the lake
was unimportant. This the Court of Appeals recognized. Yet in a
long discussion Judge Ruger reaches the conclusion that title to its
-bed was not in the state but passed to Massachusetts under the treaty
of Hartford."4
Title to the bed of Keuka Lake was discussed by Judge Haight,
later of the Court of Appeals, while sitting at Special Term. He as2Stewart v. Turney, 237 N. Y. 117, 124, 142 N. E. 437, 439 (I923).
3811inois Central R. R. v. Illinois, supra note 17.
38
375 Wend. 423 (N. Y. 1830).
Supra note 12.
39129 N. Y. 316, 29 N. E. 289 (I89I).
4
0Supra note i.
lSupra note 35.
4albid. 123, 142 N. E. at 439.
421d.
4Smith v. Rochester, supra note 1.
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sumed that it belonged to the riparian proprietors.4 4 Very lately,
however, the Appellate Division has taken the opposite view with
regard to Canandaigua Lake.4 The case was tried before a referee
who wrote an able and exhaustive opinion- with whose reasoning,
however, I disagree. There was a simple'affirmance on appeal. Otsego
Lake is much the same size. The state has assumed to own its bed
and has made grants of land under water.
Next we have Cazenovia, never used for commercial traffic. Its
outlet is a small creek. The old General Term held that title to its
46
bed was in the riparian owners.
The chief difficulty seems to come, therefore, with regard to these
lakes of moderate size---Onondaga, Otsego, Keuka or Canandaiguasmaller than Cayuga, larger than Croton. What are the probabilities
here, we can only prophecy.
The bed of Cayuga belongs to the
state--of Croton, to the adjoining proprietors. Where is the line to
be drawn? What test applied?
An interesting article on this subject by Mr. Colson appeared in
the CORNEI;L LAw QUARTERLY. 4 7 ie states the rule as to small lakes
and ponds as it is well understood. As to larger waters he says truly
that the question has never been determined by the Court of Appeals.
But lakes like Hemlock and Keuka, in fact navigated by common carriers but whose navigation is confined within their own boundaries,
he distinguishes from lakes still longer, which "are connected by navigable water with other navigable waters of the state, so that commerce is not restricted to their own shores.'" 4 "a Such a lake is Seneca.
In the one case the cession treaty or a patent from the State carried
title to their beds. In the other it did not.
Ingenious as this theory is, apparently no support for it is found
in the adjudged cases. In most dicta mere size seems to be the prevailing factor. However, it had little influence in regard to Hemlock
Lake. Here shape may be important. Seven miles long by half a
mile wide, on the map it appears like a broadened river, and, as has
been said, the law as to lakes is based on the law of rivers. It maybe
that width is of more importance than length. The same rule might
not be applied to a lake forty miles long and a quarter of a mile wide
and to one ten miles by one.
4Crooked Lake Nay. Co. v. IKeuka Nay. C., 43 Hun 635 (N. Y. 1887).
45
Granger v. City of Canandaigua, 243 N. Y. Supp. Q12 (App. Div. 4th Dept.
1930).
46Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. IO2 (N. Y. 1862).
4
7olson, Title to Beds of Lakes in New York (1924) 9 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
159, 288.

47aIbid. 310.
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In Ledyard v. Ten Eyck 8 stress is laid on the fact that Cazenovia
Lake is not used for commercial navigation, a matter not thought
decisive in the Hemlock Lake case. The opinion of the old General
Term was apparently written without adequate thought or study, and
should such a question again arise, it is far from certain that it would
be followed by the Court of Appeals.
The result is unsatisfactory. No rule can be laid down always
and everywhere applicable. Every case will have to be considered
on its own special facts. This, however, is no new experience. We
may define negligence in general terms. Whether a certain act'is
negligent depends on many considerations.
We cannot say what the Court of Appeals will do in specific instances. It will doubtless consider size as of great importance.
Probably it will consider shape and navigability. Probably evidence
bearing on practical construction of the grants under which title is
claimed will be received. Dominion and control of the state, acquiesced in by riparian proprietors and claims and acts of the latter
may be considered. The court may endeavor to interpret the attitude
of the parties when the grant was made. It certainly will treat the
cession to Massachusetts as it would if made to an individual.
The guess of the writer is that as to such lakes as Canandaigua,
Keuka and Chautauqua it will decide the fee in the bed is in the state.
So as to lakes the size and shape of Onondaga. So, very likely as to
a lake like Cazenovia. The bed of a lake like Hemlock-riverlike in
shape--will go to riparian owners. Somewhere a line will be drawn
between the "vast" inland seas spoken of by Judge Ruger, and the
small lakes and ponds - whose bed admittedly the state has not retained.
48Supra note 46.

